Armenian Government Asks EU to Deploy Team Ahead of Elections, Raising Concerns of Foreign Meddling

The European Union is preparing to support Armenia ahead of its parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026. The focus is on preventing possible Russian interference and protecting the integrity of the election process.

According to a letter obtained by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan sent a request to Brussels on February 13 asking for the deployment of a “hybrid rapid response team” to Yerevan. The team would work to counter disinformation and other forms of hybrid threats that may emerge during the election period.

The European Union previously sent a similar team to Chișinău during Moldova’s parliamentary elections last year. Around 20 experts were deployed to assist Moldovan authorities in detecting and countering disinformation spread from Russia on social media. Both Brussels and Chișinău considered the mission successful. EU officials now want to apply a similar model in Armenia as the country prepares for what is expected to be a politically sensitive year.

Diplomatic notes from discussions in Brussels state that the EU wants to “express support for strengthening Armenia’s democratic resilience and information integrity both ahead of the June 2026 elections, and during the ongoing peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” The notes also say that “the proposed support for Armenia should be aimed clearly at reducing and mitigating Russia’s destabilizing activities.”

The EU’s diplomatic service, known as the European External Action Service, has also been asked to continue outreach to Azerbaijan. The goal is to explain the purpose of the EU’s support to Armenia and to avoid negatively affecting the ongoing peace process between the two countries.

Azerbaijan has previously expressed concerns about EU assistance to Armenia, including nonlethal military aid and the current EU civilian mission in the country, called European Union Mission in Armenia. Established in 2023, EUMA has around 225 personnel deployed along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. They patrol the Armenian side of the border and aim to build confidence and stability on the ground. The mission’s mandate runs until early 2027.

The possible new EU mission would overlap with EUMA but would focus more specifically on hybrid threats, including election security and disinformation. One diplomatic note describes its role as “safeguarding the integrity of the election process, possibly closely followed by a constitutional referendum.”

EU diplomats have indicated that there is a desire to have the new mission operational by the time of the EU-Armenia summit in Yerevan on May 4. For that to happen, a decision would likely need to be taken in March. Two separate approvals from EU member states are required: one to formally establish the mission and another to launch it.

However, the process is not without challenges. Armenia does not have the same level of European integration as Moldova, which is an official EU candidate country. Some member states have previously raised concerns about support to Yerevan. Hungary, in particular, has blocked EU decisions related to Armenia in the past, arguing that Azerbaijan should receive equal treatment.

EU officials have noted that if “equal treatment” is requested, parallel support measures for Azerbaijan could be considered. At the same time, there is hope in Brussels that Azerbaijan may view the new mission more positively if it is linked to supporting the peace process and normalization of relations in the region, including between Armenia and Turkey.

Financing is another concern. The EU budget is currently under pressure due to missions and activities planned or ongoing in countries such as Egypt, Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon. Some diplomats have suggested that a new Armenia mission could have a “lean footprint,” with only a small core team of experts and additional support staff drawn from EUMA.

In parallel with its work related to Armenia, the EU is also dealing with internal disagreements over a new sanctions package against Russia. On February 23, EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels failed to approve fresh sanctions that were expected to coincide with the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

Hungary and Slovakia vetoed the package over concerns related to disruptions in Russian oil deliveries through the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline. Hungary is also blocking a proposed 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine that EU leaders tentatively agreed on in December.

Despite the setback, EU diplomats expect that the sanctions package will eventually be approved. Much of the text has already been agreed upon. One key measure in the proposal is a maritime service ban on Russian oil products. This would prevent EU economic operators from providing services to vessels transporting these products from Russian ports.

The measure would effectively replace the current oil price cap imposed by the Group of Seven. Under the proposed system, EU vessels would be barred from transporting Russian oil, and non-EU vessels would not be able to rely on EU port services or insurance.

The draft sanctions text refers to the “Price Cap Coalition,” an informal group that includes the G7 countries, all EU member states, and Australia. The document states that “the [European] Council should be informed as soon as possible of any agreement of the Price Cap Coalition, and the Council should decide, based on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that the oil price cap is no longer applicable, with the result that a full ban on maritime services related to Russian crude oil and petroleum products would enter into force.”

Additional measures in the package include targeting 45 more vessels linked to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, bringing the total number of affected ships to nearly 700. Russian icebreakers are also included, as they are considered important for oil and gas exports from northern Russia.

The sanctions would expand import and export restrictions on various goods, including rubber, animal hides, scrap steel, minerals, and industrial tractors. More Russian banks, including 20 smaller regional institutions, would be added to the sanctions list. The package also introduces a ban on engaging with Russia’s “digital ruble.”

Companies from China, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates would face tighter export restrictions. Some firms from China, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan would have their assets frozen in the EU. For the first time, the EU is also activating its anti-circumvention tool to block exports of Computer Numerical Control machines and radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan after a sharp increase in trade flows raised concerns about re-exports to Russia.

The Georgian port of Kulevi and a port in Indonesia would face transaction bans for allegedly assisting Russia’s shadow fleet. Azerbaijan’s Yelo Bank and two banks in Kyrgyzstan would be sanctioned for helping circumvent restrictions, while three Tajik banks would be removed from a previous blacklist after demonstrating compliance.

An Armenian bank, OJSC Unibank, was initially included in an early draft of the sanctions list but was later removed after Armenian authorities provided evidence that it does not engage in sanctionable transactions with Russia.

As the EU marks the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine, European Parliament members are holding a special plenary session. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to address lawmakers by video. EU leaders, including Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa, are in Kyiv for meetings with Ukrainian officials and other European leaders.

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